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 In this paper we use a two-stage game to model endogenous mergers. In the second stage 
of the game, firms compete on the product market. In the first stage, anticipating what 
will happen in the second stage, firms decide whether or not to merge. In the model, 
merger occurrence is determined by the interplay of the initial number of firms in the 
industry, the expected competitive intensity, and the possibility to economize on fixed 
costs through merger. It is shown that the equilibrium market structure concentration is 
decreasing in the first of these factors and increasing in the other two. Some implications 
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Mergers and acquisitions have long interested economists because of its impacts 
on both the merged companies and its competitors and consumers. However, and 
contrary to what's standard practice in economics, mergers have resisted formal modeling 
of its effects until the 80's. It is only in 1983 that Salant, Switzer and Reynolds publish 
the now well known “Losses from Horizontal Mergers: The Effects of an Exogenous 
Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium”. In this article the authors 
analyze the impact of a merger among an exogenously determined subset of the n firms 
in an industry, assuming Cournot behavior and constant average and marginal costs. 
Their surprising conclusion is that no merger involving less than 80 percent of the firms 
in the industry would be privately profitable. 
The robustness of this conclusion has been challenged by the supervening 
literature. Perry and Porter (1985), using a cost function that implies an advantage for 
larger firms, show that the range of profitable mergers is larger than in Salant, Switzer 
and Reynolds constant costs model. Deneckere and Davidson (1985), assuming constant 
costs but Bertrand behavior, show that every merger is privately profitable, regardless the 
number of participating firms. Kwoka (1989), using a conjectural variation model, shows 
the number of firms that must be involved in a merger so that it is privately profitable is 
inversely related to the competitiveness of the industry. 
In any of these models, merger is an exogenous event. In this paper, we present a 
model of endogenous mergers: merging is a strategic variable controlled by firms, and the 
occurrence of mergers, and the identity of the participating firms, are determined within 
the model. Kamien and Zang (1991) were the first to propose this type of model. 
Specifically, they analyze the conditions that limit the possibility of monopolization of an 
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industry, by intra-industry acquisition of firms. Their main conclusion is that 
monopolization can only occur in industries composed ex-ante by a small number of 
firms, a conclusion that our model reiterates. Gaudet and Salant (1992) extend the 
previous model and, among other conclusions, show that not every privately profitable 
merger will occur when the merger is endogenously determined, a conclusion that, again, 
we reiterate. Gowrisankaran (1997) presents a particularly complex model in which firms 
make merger, exit, investment and entry decisions before competing in the products 
market. Using dynamic programming methods the author is able to characterize one, not 
necessarily unique, Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibrium for this game. Among his 
conclusions, the fact that an increase in entry costs results in increased concentration 
through merger is particularly relevant. 
Our model consists of a two stage game: in the first stage firms decide whether or 
not to carry mergers among them; in the second stage the remaining firms compete in the 
product market. The mergers that occur endogenously are explained by the interplay of 
the number of firms existing at the start of the game, the expected competitive intensity 
and the economies permitted by the merger. The larger the initial number of firms, the 
smaller the percentage of the firms in the industry that will be involved in mergers. In 
fact, if the number of initial firms is sufficiently large, no merger will occur. Secondly, 
the stronger the expected competitive intensity, the larger the number of firms that will be 
involved in mergers and, consequently, the larger the equilibrium level of concentration. 
Finally, unsurprisingly, the larger the economies permitted by the mergers, the larger the 
number of firms that will be involved in mergers. 
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COMPETITION IN THE PRODUCT MARKET 
We follow Kwoka (1989) in modeling competition on the product market using a 
conjectural variation model. The conjectural variation model is widely criticized both for 
the inconsistency of its equilibrium solution, which in general doesn't qualify as a Nash 
equilibrium, and for assuming that firms react to their competitors moves, in spite of 
being a static model. The model can, however, be reinterpreted as a reduced form for the 
equilibrium of dynamic models of competition, as shown by Riordan (1985), Dockner 
(1992) and Cabral (1995). It is in this spirit that we use it herei. For the purposes of this 
paper, the model has the great advantage of providing a continuous measure of 
competitive intensity, through the coefficient of conjectural variation. Our general 
conclusions would still emerge, we believe, if we proceeded by comparing the results of 
model for alternative formulations (Bertrand, Cournot, cartel, etc) of the second stage of 
the game. 
Let's assume an n firm homogenous product oligopoly. Market demand and firm 
cost curves are given by: 
QaP −=  (1) 
FcqCT ii +=  (2) 
where P is the market price, Q, the demanded quantity, and qi, the quantity supplied by 
firm i. F and c are, respectively, average and fixed costs parameters, that we assume 
identical for all firms. Of course, ii qqQ −+= , with q-i representing the quantity supplied 
by i-th firm n–1 competitors. This implies that firm i's profit is: 
( ) FcqqQa iii −−−=Π  (3) 
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Assuming quantity as the strategic variable, profit maximization requires that 













 where iii dqdq−=λ  is firm i's conjectural variation, i.e., its expectation 
regarding the change in its competitors production resulting from a change in its own 
production level. We will assume that this conjecture is identical for all firms and so 
λλ =i . Since firms are assumed identical as regards all relevant aspects of its activity, 
the quantities they will produce in equilibrium will also necessarily be identical. Then, 





caqi   (5) 
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λ   (7) 
It is well known that, depending on the value of the conjectural variation 
parameter, the equilibrium solutions to the conjectural variation model will coincide with 
that of several "classical" models: for 1−=λ  the industry will supply the same quantity 
as a competitive industry, while cartel behavior would be replicated with 1−= nλ . 
 4
Between these values, 0=λ  implies Cournot behavior. Parameter  can, in a sense, be 
understood as an inverse measure of the competitive intensity in the industry. 
We will restrict the parameter values to 0>− ca , ,  e 2≥n 0≥F 11 −≤≤− nλ . 
We would note, from the outset, that for these values of the parameters, each firm's profit 
is a decreasing function of the number of firms in the industry, the amount of fixed costs 
and competitive intensity.  
 
 
THE IMPACT OF AN EXOGENOUS MERGER 
Kwoka (1989) analyzes the impact of exogenous mergers, using a conjectural 
variation model, such as the one presented, but assuming the existence of no fixed costs. 
In this section we follow is analysis closely, but assuming the existence of such costs. 
Suppose m+1 of the n firms composing an industry merge. The new number of 
firms in the industry will be mnn −=′ . Assume, further, that the merger has no impact 
on firms' conjectural variations and marginal costs. This being so, only fixed costs can 
distinguish the firm resulting from the merger from the other firms in the industry and, 
indeed, from the firms involved in the merger. But, since fixed costs are irrelevant for the 
determination of the profit maximizing production level, the post-merger (pm) 
equilibrium will still be characterized by identical production for each of the  firms. 
















Comparing (8) and (9) with (5) and (6) it can be seen that, post-merger, the firm 
resulting from the merger will produce less than the sum of the pre-merger production of 
the merged firms, but more than any of them produced separately, that each of the non-
merging firms will increase its production and that the overall production level will 
decrease. 
What will happen to the profit of the firm resulting from the merger depends on 
what happens to its fixed costs. On one extreme, we could assume that those costs had a 
sunk nature, and so were not adjustable post-merger, implying that the firm resulting 
from the merger would have the same fixed costs as the whole of the firms that had 
merged. On the other extreme, we could assume the firm resulting from the merger to 
have fixed costs equal to those of one the merged firms: this could happen if those fixed 
costs resulted from some indivisibility in the production factors or if the merger was 
purely anti-competitive, resulting in the closure of all but one of the merged firms. 
Between these extremes, we can assume that fixed costs would be partially 
adjustable post-merger. Let h be a coefficient measuring the degree in which the merger 
















λ  (10) 
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We can now compare the post-merger profit of the firm resulting from the merger 
with the pre-merger profit of the merged firms:  
( ) ipmi mg Π+−Π= 1  (11) 
which, replacing (7) and (10), is shown to be 
( )( )





























λ  (12) 
It is now possible to check whether the merger of any subset of the n firms in the 
industry is privately profitable. Start with 1−=λ , equivalent to a competitive industry. In 
this case, the first term in (12) is zero. Then, has could be expected, merger among a 
subset of the firms in the industry will only be profitable if it allows for fixed costs 
economies. The only exception to this conclusion is, of course, the case in which all the n 
firms in the industry merge, destroying its competitive nature, which is always profitable. 
Similarly, if the firms expect a cartel type of behavior, there isn't also, absent fixed cost 
economies, any incentive to merge.ii In fact, even without any merger the industry profit 
is already maximized there being room for no improvement. The merger of all the n 
firms, creating a multi-plant monopoly, would only maintain the pre-merger industry 
profit, while the merger of any smaller subset of the firms would imply a loss for the 
merged firms because, transforming them in a single firm, would reduce their share in the 
same industry profit pie.  
If 11 −<<− nλ , i.e., firms' behavior is somewhere between the extremes of 
competitive and cartel behavior. In this case, it is a sufficient condition for the merger to 
be privately profitable that: 
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In fact, if  or 0=F 0=θ , (13) is also a necessary conditions for merger's private 








mn λ  (14) 
which allows some general conclusions. First, for any given m+1 number of 
participants in the merger, there is always an industry size n sufficiently large for the 
merger to be unprofitable. Second, for any given m+1 number of participants in the 
merger, the larger the competitive intensity in the industry, i.e., the smaller λ, the larger 
the maximum industry size n for which the merger is still profitable. Third, merger to 
monopoly, i.e., , is always profitable. Fourth, since g is increasing in m, if the 
merger among a certain subset of firms in the industry is profitable, a merger among a 
larger subset of those firms is even more profitable. And, corollary of the preceding 
conclusion, the merger that creates a monopoly is the most profitable of the mergers that 
can happen in an industry. 
nm =+1
Kwoka (1989) presents these conclusions We would note, further, that the 
consideration of fixed costs, and of the possibility that mergers allows for fixed cost 
economies, enlarges the range of privately profitable mergers. In fact, inspection of (12) 
reveals that if those economies are sufficiently important any merger will be profitable. 
This leads us to believe that some of the paradoxical results found in the literature, 
namely those presented by Salant, Switzer e Reynolds (1983), can be partially explained 
by failure to consider this possibility.  
 8
Secondly, we would note that the preceding analysis assumes that the competitive 
intensity is unchanged by the merger. But both the theoretical and the empirical literature 
on collusion show that this becomes easier as the number of firms in the industry gets 
smalleriii. It would, then, seem reasonable to assume that ( )nf=λ  with 0<dndλ . 
Again, this possibility would enlarge the range of privately profitable mergers. In the 
endogenous merger model of the next section, however, we stick with the invariant 
conjectural variations hypothesis. 
 
 
A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS MERGERS 
In this section we consider a two stage game in which, on the first stage, the firms 
must decide whether to merge or not, and, on the second stage, the remaining firms 
compete on the product market, as described by the conjectural variation model. On what 
circumstances, if any, would firms decide to merge? 
We consider an extremely simplified process of endogenous merger formation. 
On the first stage of the game, firms announce sequentially whether they are available to 
participate in a merger. All firms having made their announcements, those that declared 
available to merge, merge in single firm, with the other firms remaining as independent 
competitors. This implies that the model does not allow for multiple mergers to occur, 
which is one of its limitations.iv
The merger formation process, as described, cannot be construed as a realistic 
representation of most real merger cases. However, some specific cases do have a degree 
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of resemblance with the scheme proposed. We have particularly in mind, certain 
situations in which an external entity (the State or an investment bank being examples) 
does initiate a merger process by inviting the firms in the industry to analyze the 
possibility to merge.v
In what follows, we assume m=θ , i.e., the most favorable situation in what 
regards the possibility of obtaining fixed cost economies through merger. This is not 
restrictive since we analyze what happens for different values of fixed costs and, for our 
purposes, lower values of h would be tantamount to lower fixed costs. In particular, 
0=θ , i.e., the case in which the merger doesn't allow any fixed cost economies is 
equivalent to the case where firms have no fixed costs. 
A condensed (since this is an n firm game) extensive form representation of the 
game is as follows: 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
We chose to model the first stage of the game in a sequential fashion on two 
grounds. First, a simultaneous endogenous merger game formation game, with the 
decision rule we use, would always have 1+n  trivial Nash equilibria, in which no firm 
would merge whatever the conditions on the product market. These equilibria correspond 
to the case where every firm announces that it is no prepared to merge and to n situations 
where all but one of the firms say they are nor prepared to merge and the remaining firm 
says otherwise. Such situations are not equilibria in the sequential game when the 
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situation in product market is conductive to merger, which we regard as an advantage. 
Second, the sequential process seems to adjust better to the characteristics of the real 
merger processes in which, typically, firms do observe their competitors' moves. 
We use the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept to analyze the game 
described. In the preceding section, we showed that the merger to monopoly is always 
profitable and the most profitable of all possible mergers. So, it is only natural that we 
start our analysis by the study of the conditions in which firms would merge to 
monopoly. 
 
Merger to Monopoly 
The analysis of the extensive form of the game makes clear that 
( ) ( )n
12 Π<Π   (15) 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for monopolization. A necessary condition 
since, even if every other firm has committed to merge, i.e., has announced "yes", the n-
th firm will only do the same if its share of the monopoly profit, which it will earn in case 
of joining the merger, exceeds the duopoly profit that it can earn by refusing to merge 
and becoming the single competitor of the firm that results from the merger of its n-1 
rivals. 
To check that (15) is also a sufficient condition for monopolization go back to the 
node where, after n-2 firms have committed to merge, the (n-1)-th firm has to decide 
what to do. If (15) is verified, the firm knows that, if it announces "yes", the n-th firm 
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will do the same, giving it a (1)/n profit. If it announces "no", depending on what firm n 
will do, the (n-1)-th firm profit will be either (2) or (3). From (7), we know that, in this 
model, a firm's profit is decreasing with the number of firms in the industry, implying 
that (2) > (3). But (15) assures us that (2), and consequently also (3), is smaller than 
(1)/n. So, (15) holding true, the (n-1)-th must commit to merge. Using backward 
induction we can show that, condition (15) holding, every firm will commit to merge 
resulting in the monopolization of the industry. 
Condition (15) is equivalent to 






















λ  (16) 
The first member of this inequality is obtained making 2=n  in (7) and dividing 
by . The second member is monopoly profit divided by ( 2ca − ) ( )2ca − . Given the linear 
specification of the demand curve in (1), ( )ca −  is the quantity that would be demanded 
at a competitive price, allowing us to interpret ( )2ca −  as a measure of the market size. 










λn   (16’) 
In this section we will restrict the conjectural variation coefficient to the range 
11 ≤≤− λ vi. In this range, the second member in the above inequality is strictly 
decreasing in . So, absent fixed costs, the smaller the competitive intensity, the larger 
the pre-merger market concentration will have to be for a monopoly to emerge through 
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merger. In fact, except for very competitive industries, i.e., industries in which  is very 
close to -1, monopolization will only occur in very concentrated industries, in line with 
one of Kamien e Zang's (1990) conclusions. As an example, for  = 0, equivalent to 
Cournot behavior, monopolization will only occur for 25.2<n , implying that no 
industry in which at least three firms coexist will be monopolized. And for sufficiently 
cooperative industries, as implied by 1=λ , (16’) merger to monopoly will never occur. 
Condition (16’) becomes less restrictive as the industry becomes more 
competitive: with λ = -0.7 monopolization would occur if there were 4, or less, firms; 
with λ = -0.8, if there were 6, or less, firms; and, with λ = -0.9 if there were 11, or less, 
firms. In the limit case of 1−=λ , (16') is always verified, implying that merger would 
occur whatever the number of firms in the industry: small as a firm's share of monopoly 
profit can be, it will always be larger than the zero profit it would earn if the merger to 
monopoly didn't happen. 
Low fixed costs. In the general case, in which fixed costs are positive, 
corresponding to (16), the conclusions depend on the value assumed by the ratio between 
fixed costs and market sizevii. We will analyze the case of low fixed costs first, this being 
closest to the case of zero fixed costs just examined. Particularly, suppose that 








F  (17) 
This is equivalent to saying that fixed costs are such that both duopoly and 
monopoly profits are positive. This being so, both members of (16) are also positive, and 
solving that condition for n we get: 
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( )



















λ  (16’’) 
In this case, the conclusion obtained in the preceding subsection, that the smaller 
the competitive intensity the larger the pre-merger concentration will have to be for a 
monopoly to emerge through merger, continues to hold. 
But, as fixed costs approach the upper limit allowed by (17), condition (16'') 
becomes less and less restrictive, as its second member tends to infinity. As an example, 
for  = 0, equivalent to Cournot behavior, monopoly would emerge endogenously for 
industries with no more than 2 firms, if fixed costs are 0.04, in industries with no more 
than 7 firms, if fixed costs are 0.09, and in industries with no more than 125 firms, if 
fixed costs are 0.11. 
High fixed costs. Suppose now that fixed costs are sufficiently high for both 




F  (18) 
In this case, solving (16) for n we get: 
( )





















Note that, since ( ) ( ) 4131 2 <++ λλ , the above condition implies that the critical 
value for n is always in the interval 0 to 1. This implies, fixed costs being sufficiently 
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high, that any industry with, at least, 2 firms, whatever its competitive intensity, will be 
monopolized through merger. 
Intermediate fixed costs. We have yet to analyze the case when neither (17) nor 
(18) hold, i.e., the case in which fixed costs are sufficiently high for the duopolist's profits 
to be negative but the monopolist's to be positive. Simple inspection of (16) shows that its 
first member is then negative while the second is positive implying that, as in the 
preceding case, whatever the number of firms in the industry and its competitive 
intensity, a monopoly would always emerge through merger. 
In short, in this model, with low or zero fixed costs, monopolization will only 
occur if the initial number of firms in the industry is sufficiently small or its competitive 
intensity is sufficiently strong. On the other hand, if fixed costs are sufficiently high, 
monopolization will always occur, whatever the number of firms and competitive 
intensity in the industry. 
 
Merger to Duopoly 
Since monopolization will occur on relatively restrict circumstances, we now 
analyze the conditions in which other concentrated market structures would emerge 
through merger, starting with the case of duopoly.  
Duopoly, or any other market structure, will only occur if the necessary and 
sufficient condition for monopolization (16) is not verified. As seen in the preceding 
section, if (17) does not hold (16) is always verified and monopoly is the equilibrium 
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market structure. The following analysis is then restricted to the cases in which (17) does 
hold, that is ( ) ( ) ( )22 31 ++<− λλcaF . 
Assuming (17) holds, it is a necessary condition for duopoly to occur that (16’’) is 
not verified, or 
( )





















It is also a necessary condition for duopoly that 







  (20) 
(20) simply means that for a firm to be interested in joining a merger that will 
result in a duopoly, sharing its profit, it must earn more than it could earn by remaining 
an independent competitor in a triopoly. 
To check that (19) and (20) are necessary and, considered together, sufficient 
conditions for a duopoly to emerge as the equilibrium market structure, we start the 
analysis at the node where, after every preceding firm having committed to merge, the (n-
1)-th firm must decide whether or not to do the same. Assuming (19) holds the firm 
knows that if it says "yes", joining the merger, the n-th firm will say "no", originating a 
duopoly. On the other hand, if it says "no", then, (20) holding, the n-th firm will say 
"yes", again originating a duopoly. Given these prospects, the (n-1)-th firm will say "no", 
assuring full duopolist profit for itself, inducing the n-th firm to say "yes". Backward 
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induction leads to the conclusion that, when (19) and (20) hold together, the first firm to 
decide will refuse to merge, inducing all its competitors to merge in a single firm. 
Replacing the profit functions in (20) by (7), and dividing both members by 
, (20) is shown to be equivalent to ( 2ca − )



























λ  (21) 
Duopoly in the absence of fixed costs. Suppose, first, that there are no fixed costs. 








λn  (21’) 










λn  (19’) 
Taken together, (21’) e (19’) implies that, absent fixed costs, duopoly will never 
emerge through merger: duopoly can only be the equilibrium market structure when, 
from the outset, there are only two firms in the industry. To check this conclusion note, 
first, that for 44321.0−<λ , if (21’) holds, (19’) is violated. Hence, duopoly will never be 
the equilibrium market structure, in this case. Note, then, that for the relevant values of 
this parameter, the second member in (21’) is strictly decreasing in , being, for every  
exceeding -0.44321, always smaller than 2.9352. This implies duopoly will not occur if, 
initially, there are at least 3 firms in the industry: in equilibrium, duopoly will never 
occur through merger. 
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Duopoly with high fixed costs.ix Suppose, now, that 
















F  (22) 
With fixed costs in this range, for which a duopolist earns a positive profit but a 
tripolist doesn't, (21) is always verified, implying that duopoly is the equilibrium market 
structure. This, of course, assuming the number of firms in the industry exceeds the 
critical level defined by (19). 
Duopoly with low fixed costs. Finally, with low fixed costs, defined as 










F  (23) 
 (21) becomes 
( ) ( )


























In the range defined by (23), the second member in this condition is strictly 
increasing in ( )2caF − , tending to infinity as ( )2caF −  approaches, from the left, the 
upper limit of the interval. This implies that, for fixed costs sufficiently close to that limit, 
if the number of firms exceeds the critical level defined by (19), duopoly will emerge as 
the equilibrium market structure. 
On the contrary, as ( )2caF −  approaches zero, duopoly will only emerge if the 
industry is, from the outset, sufficiently concentrated. In fact, if fixed costs are 
sufficiently small, duopoly will never occur through merger. In the range defined by (23) 
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the number of firms that may coexist initially in order for duopoly to be the equilibrium 
market structure is a non-linear function of the competitive intensity. 
 
Equilibrium market structure 
We now ask, more generally, in what conditions will the existence of n' firms be 
the equilibrium market structure of a given industry? 
It has already been shown that, if (16) holds, monopoly will be the equilibrium 
market structure. That will be the case, among other circumstances, when (17) doesn't 
hold. When (16) does not hold, we can show by backward induction that the existence of 
n' firms will be the equilibrium of the game if the following two conditions hold: 
a) That one firm that decides to join a merger that will result in the existence of n' 
firms will earn a greater profit than would be the case if it decided not to merge 
and remain as an independent competitor in a n' + 1 market structure; that is 






n  (24) 
b) That the conditions for the existence of n’-1 to be an equilibrium are not 
fulfilled. 
Using (7), (24) is shown to be equivalent to 



























λ  (25) 
As it regards condition b, it corresponds to (19), if n’-1 is 1, and to the denial of 
(25) for greater values of n’-1. 
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Absence of fixed costs. When there are no fixed costs, (25) implies that it is a 










nnn   (25’) 
The second member in this condition is strictly decreasing in n’ and , and, for n’ 
> 2 and  > -1, is always a value in the range of 0 to 1. Hence, any market structure 
comprising more than 2 firms can only be the equilibrium market structure if it is also the 
initial market structure. But we had already proved that the same was true regarding 
duopoly. So, we can now state that, absent fixed costs, the only mergers that would occur 
endogenously would be mergers to monopoly. And, even these will only occur if the 
number of firms in the industry is sufficiently small, or the competitive intensity 
sufficiently strong, for (16’) to hold. 
Low fixed costs. However, this conclusion is only valid in the absence of fixed 
costs. If these exist, and depending on their amount, the equilibrium market structure may 
include any number of firms, and may arise through merger. If fixed costs are low, such 
that 










F  (26) 
the existence of  firms will be the equilibrium, given the initial number of 
firms, the expected competitive intensity and the fixed costs, if  
2≥′n
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )





















































in which the first inequality corresponds to condition b above and the second to 
condition a. This, of course, assuming that monopoly is not the equilibrium market 
structure. 
High fixed costs. If fixed costs are such that 



















the profit of a firm is positive in an n' firms market structure but negative in n' +1 
firms market structure. This implies that (25) always holds and the existence of n' firms 
will be the equilibrium market structure regardless of the initial number of firms in the 
industry. This supposing that the conditions for a more concentrated market structure to 
be an equilibrium are not fulfilled. Of course, if the initial number of firms is greater than 
n', the equilibrium market structure will emerge through merger. 
A numerical example. A numerical example will help clarifying the implications 
of the above conditions for the equilibrium market structure and the occurrence of 
mergers. Table 1 presents the number of firms that would constitute the equilibrium, for 
various values of competitive intensity and fixed costs, assuming that initially there were 
10 firms in the industry. 
-------------------------------- 





The market structure tends to become more concentrated the stronger the 
competitive intensity and the higher the fixed costs. At very low levels of fixed costs 
( ( ) 001,02 =− caF ) the equilibrium market structure coincides with the initial market 
structure if the competitive intensity is not extremely strong ( 8,0<λ ). But, if the 
competitive intensity is extremely strong, the firms will merge to monopoly. The same 
will happen if fixed costs are very high ( ( ) 12,02 =− caF ), whatever the competitive 
intensity. For intermediate values of the fixed costs and the competitive intensity, the 




In the model presented in this paper, three factors interact to determine whether or 
not firms will merge: the initial number of firms in the industry, the expected competitive 
intensity and the possibility to economize on fixed costs through merger. The model 
shows that the equilibrium market structure concentration, and firms propensity to merge, 
is decreasing in the first of these factors and increasing in the other two, a conclusion 
capable of empirical refutation. 
In model such as the one presented here, in which firms are identical in all 
relevant aspects, the number of firms is a perfect concentration index and is directly 
related to the production level and inversely related to the price level. It is then possible 
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to assert that, in this model, (expected) competitive intensity is inversely related to the 
consumer surplus, and, depending on the cost economies permitted by the merger, 
possibly also inversely related to welfare. This result, that seems to run contrary to the 
direct relation between competition and consumer surplus and welafare often admitted in 
industrial organization, echoes other results in the two-stage game literature. Sutton 
(1992), for example, studying entry under alternative hypothesis regarding competition in 
the product market, shows that more intense expected competition leads to less entry: in 
the limit, if firms expect Bertrand competition, only one firm will enter and the market 
will be monopolized. 
In a certain sense, our model reinforces the paradoxical result of Salant, Switzer e 
Reynolds (1983). These authors have shown that, in the absence of fixed costs, with 
Cournot competition, only mergers joining at least 80% of the firms in the industry 
would be privately profitable. Our model shows that, in the absence of fixed costs, the 
only mergers that would occur endogenously would be mergers to monopoly, that is, 
mergers among 100% of the firms in the industry. And, even those, only if the industry 
was, from the outset, sufficiently concentrated or sufficiently competitive. A corollary of 
these result, that subject to the restrictions implied by the model's assumptions may be 
relevant to antitrust policy, is that the occurrence of a merger that does not join all the 
firms in an industry signals the existence of cost economies. 
American antitrust policy, and also other countries' policies, regards the 
competitive history of an industry as positive element in the evaluation of proposed 
mergers. The model raises the possibility that such may be inappropriate: it is precisely in 
strongly competitive markets that the incentive to merge, and the competitive harm 
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resulting from mergers, is larger. Of course, the possibility of entry, that the model 
ignores, may limit the relevance of this conclusion. But, again, Sutton's (1992) 
conclusions also point in the direction that a history of strong competitiveness will 
dissuade entry. 
The model presented has important limitations that represent, also, opportunities 
for improvement. We'll mention just a few of the most obvious. First, as is typical of 
most game literature, the model concentrates in a particular aspect of the competitive 
process, mergers, ignoring its interactions with entry, exit and every other strategic aspect 
of a firm's life. Secondly, and very unrealistically, the model assumes that the expected 
competitive intensity is independent of the expected number of firms in the market. 
Thirdly, in this model only fixed cost economies are considered. No true efficiency 
impact of mergers is considered. Fourthly, the model assumes identical firms. Allowing 
for firm heterogeneity might greatly enhance it. Finally, the endogenous merger 
formation process considered is highly simplified and restrictive. On one hand, it is a 
sequential and closed decision process: firms must irreversibly decide whether to merge 
in a pre-determined order. Firms are not allowed to choose the moment of their decision. 
On the other hand, as defined, the process generates a single merger. A model that deals 
with, at least, some of these limitations might greatly improve our understanding of 
mergers and acquisitions. It remains to be seen whether the general conclusions presented 
here would extend to such an improved model. 
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"No" - the firm commits not to participate in the merger 
"Yes" - the firm commits to participate in the merger 
(n’) - the single firm profit in an n' firm industry 
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TABLE 1 
Number of firms in the equilibrium market structure,  
for an industry which initialy had 10 firms,  
assuming various level of competitive intensity ( ) and fixed costs 
  Fixed costs 
  0,001 0,010 0,050 0,100 0,120 
-1,0 1 1 1 1 1 
-0,9 1 1 1 1 1 
-0,8 10 4 1 1 1 
-0,7 10 4 1 1 1 
-0,6 10 5 1 1 1 
-0,5 10 6 2 1 1 
-0,4 10 6 2 1 1 
-0,3 10 7 2 1 1 
-0,2 10 7 2 1 1 
-0,1 10 8 3 1 1 
0,0 10 8 3 1 1 
0,1 10 8 3 1 1 
0,2 10 9 3 2 1 
0,3 10 9 3 2 1 
0,4 10 9 3 2 1 
0,5 10 9 3 2 1 
0,6 10 9 3 2 1 
0,7 10 9 3 2 1 
0,8 10 10 3 2 1 
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1
NOTES 
i Based on a survey conducted amongst industrial organization specialists, 
Aiginger, Mueller and Weiss (1998) observe that the proposition that conjectural 
variation models should not be used in research is strongly rejected. 
ii Note that assuming cartel expectations, is equivalent to assuming −= nλ  
before the merger but  1−−= mnλ  after the merger. The analysis has to use (11), in this 
case. 
iii Though the relation between the two is not necessarely linear. 
iv The literature on endogenous merger formation that we briefelly reviewed does 
indeed deal with acquisition games. Typically, each firm (each firm's shareholders) 
defines the price it is prepared to pay for each of the other firms and the price it will be 
asking for itself. Each firm is acquired by its higher bidder, if the corresponding bid is 
above the price the firm is demanding for itself. The merger formation process that we 
model has more to do with the extensive literature on coalition formation that draws both 
on cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Recent examples of endogenous 
coalition formation processes with possible aplication to mergers can be found, among 
others, in Bloch (1996) and Yi (1998).  
v That this would happen in countries with strong antitrust laws, and with little 
industrial policy tradition, such as the United States, is, of course unlikely. But examples 
may be found in other parts of the world. In his analysis of industrial conditioning in 
Portugal, Confraria (1990) describes some such situations. 
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vi If we allow  to be larger than 1, there is the possibility that the pre-merger 
conjectural variation coefficient exceeds the value that, post-merger, would imply cartel 
behavior. 
vii For the sake of simplicity we will refer to this ratio as fixed costs. 
viii Declining industries being a possible example of this type of situation. 
ix Unlike the case of monopoly, in the case of duopoly or less concentrated market 
structures, there are only two relevant ranges for fixed costs, which we call "high" and 
"low". If fixed costs exceed the upper limit defined by condition (22), corresponding to 
the third range of fixed costs we analyzed for monopoly, (17) would not hold and 
monopoly would be the equilibrium market structure. 
 30
